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SYMPOSIUM




In 2008, participants in a Symposium at Fordham Law School' were
invited to discuss "the lawyer's role in a contemporary democracy." This
book of the Fordham Law Review contains participants' writings on this
theme. It captures the richness of the Symposium and suggests possibilities
for continuing and enlarging the discussion in the future.
The contributions are wide-ranging, owing to the theme's breadth no less
than the authors' diverse perspectives. As Fred Zacharias observes, 2 the
Symposium can be interpreted variously as "a call to discuss the nature of
democracy itself," to explore lawyers' role in promoting freedoms
associated with liberal democracies, or to consider lawyers' contribution to
law reform, "enhancing individual rights and open, representative
government. ' ' 3  As Rakesh Anand notes, responses will also differ
depending on whether or not one focuses on liberal democracies and, as did
* This Symposium, held on September 17-18, 2008, was organized by Fordham University
School of Law's Louis Stein Center for Law and Ethics and was cosponsored by Stanford
Law School's Keck Center on Legal Ethics and the Legal Profession and the Fordham Law
Review. A special thanks to the David Berg Foundation, without which this event would not
have been possible.
** Louis Stein Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law; Director, Louis Stein
Center for Law and Ethics.
1. The idea for originating a national and international dialogue on the lawyer's role in
a contemporary democracy arose out of conversations with my Fordham colleagues,
Matthew Diller, Sheila Foster, Jennifer Gordon, Russell Pearce, and Ian Weinstein. Anu
Sawkar, the Fordham Law Review's Symposium Editor, and Jessi Tamayo, the Stein
Center's Associate Director, carried the laboring oar in the administration of the Symposium.
I was joined in moderating discussions during the Symposium by Richard Abel, Matthew
Diller, Howard Erichson, Toni Fine, Paolo Galizzi, Russell Pearce, Deborah Rhode, and Ian
Weinstein. In addition to those contributing to this collection, Robert Gordon, Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, and H. Kwasi Prempeh were among the principal presenters. My thanks
to all!
2. Fred C. Zacharias, True Confessions About the Role of Lawyers in a Democracy, 77
FORDHAM L. REV. 1591 (2009); see also Rakesh K. Anand, The Role of the Lawyer in the
American Democracy, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1611 (2009).
3. Zacharias, supra note 2, at 1591.
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most participants, on the United States specifically. 4 Likewise, responses
will vary depending on what one considers to be the essential features and
values of democracy-for example, whether the focus is on promoting the
rule of law and strengthening democratic institutions, on enhancing
citizens' participation in and access to institutions of governance, or on
advancing particular political or social values.
This Foreword offers a brief introduction-much too brief to do justice to
individual writings--endeavoring to suggest some unifying themes,
relationships, and tensions in the various contributions to this collection.
The Foreword then offers three stories to suggest the importance of
continuing the conversation commenced in these pages and concludes with
a few words of thanks.
I. PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW
Promoting the rule of law, some of the writings suggest, may be the most
obvious and fundamental role for lawyers in a democracy, but it is not
necessarily such a simple one. Okechukwu Oko's eye-opening account of
the Nigerian experience in particular describes how crucial yet difficult this
role is in a fragile democracy. As his essay's introduction succinctly
describes,
Because of their status, special skills, and training, lawyers have the
opportunity and indeed the obligation to help attain the nation's political
imperative of consolidating democracy. Unlike their colleagues in stable
democracies, however, African lawyers face a phalanx of harsh realities
and pragmatic constraints that severely limit their ability to deepen
democracy, or even perform their traditional functions. Africa's
distinctive problems include political instability, social disequilibrium,
insecurity, corruption, ineffective and inefficient public institutions, a
declining economy, and the lack of a democratic culture. 5
After surveying the extraordinary challenges confronting Nigerian lawyers,
Oko offers hope, identifying strategies by which Nigerian lawyers can
promote government accountability, strengthen government institutions,
revamp the legal system, combat judicial corruption, and, ultimately,
deepen democracy, even under the most difficult social and political
conditions. 6
Do twenty-first-century American lawyers, practicing in an old and stable
democracy, have anything comparable to offer? Or may they be satisfied
functioning simply as "service providers" to their clients? 7 American bar
associations and government agencies have much to say about lawyers' role
4. Anand, supra note 2, at 1616.
5. Okechukwu Oko, Lawyers in Fragile Democracies and the Challenges of
Democratic Consolidation: The Nigerian Experience, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1295, 1295-96
(2009).
6. Id. at 1322-23.
7. See Laurel S. Terry, The Future Regulation of the Legal Profession: The Impact of
Treating the Legal Profession as "Service Providers," 2008 J. PROF. LAW. 189.
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in promoting developing democracies abroad.8 But participants in the
Symposium perceived that being a lawyer in a democracy has implications
for American lawyers, that the role of promoting the rule of law is among
those that lawyers must consider, and that fulfilling this role is not always
so simple, even if the problems American lawyers address are subtler and
far less dire.
Three contributions to this collection focus particularly on how American
lawyers promote the rule of law in their representation of entities, private or
public. First, Colin Marks and Nancy Rapoport discuss the work of
corporate lawyers, focusing on the concept of Corporate Social
Responsibility, 9 which the authors describe as incorporating a corporation's
economic, legal, and ethical responsibilities.' 0 Their work examines the
corporate lawyer's role in "safeguarding the corporate 'conscience"' by
counseling corporate clients about how to balance these responsibilities."
They propose structural reform to promote corporate lawyers' ability to
enhance corporations' ethical decision making-in particular, they advocate
providing corporate lawyers greater access to powerful corporate officers
and establishing incentives within the corporation to facilitate corporate
lawyers' ability to advance an ethical code of conduct. 12
Second, Brad Wendel looks at government lawyers and particularly those
serving as counselors in the U.S. Justice Department's Office of Legal
Counsel, whose interpretations of the law both limit and justify executive
branch action. 13 Wendel wades into the debate over how lawyers should
arrive at their interpretations: May government legal advisors advance
whatever nonfrivolous interpretations best accord with the sitting
President's policy preferences-an approach that some might defend as the
most democratically accountable and that others might oppose as
improperly political or partisan? Or, at the other extreme, must government
lawyers strive, like lower court judges, for neutrality, objectivity, and
detachment, and adopt those legal interpretations that seem most consistent
with judicial precedent? Wendel answers that the obligation of fidelity to
the law dictates limits beyond those imposed on litigators-that government
8. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green & Russell G. Pearce, "Public Service Must Begin at
Home": The Lawyer as Civics Teacher in Everyday Practice, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV.
(forthcoming 2009) (Although a broad "discussion of the lawyer's role in a democracy...
was historically prominent in the United States, today it takes place largely with respect to
transitional and developing democracies, where our own bar ascribes to lawyers an
important role in promoting and sustaining democratic legal and institutional reform");
Samuel J. Levine & Russell G. Pearce, Rethinking the Legal Reform Agenda: Will Raising
the Standards for Bar Admission Promote or Undermine Democracy, Human Rights, and
Rule of Law?, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1635 (2009).
9. Colin Marks & Nancy B. Rapoport, The Corporate Lawyer's Role in a
Contemporary Democracy, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1269 (2009).
10. Id.
11. Id. at 1289.
12. Id. at 1289-92.
13. W. Bradley Wendel, Government Lawyers, Democracy, and the Rule of Law, 77
FORDHAM L. REV. 1333 (2009).
2009] 1231
FORDHAM LA W REVIEW
lawyers cannot simply pursue the Chief Executive's preferences or, for that
matter, their own sense of what best serves the public interest. 14 But he
does not advocate complete indifference to executive branch policy.
Wendel argues that the government legal advisor's interpretation of the law
calls for an exercise in legal craft, and that government lawyers may fairly
be criticized when their interpretations fail to employ accepted principles of
legal interpretation. 15 In other words, government lawyers may not have to
predict accurately what a court would ultimately say about the law, but they
do have to make plausible use of the interpretive tools that courts employ
and recognize as legitimate.
Third, drawing on the "New Governance" literature, Orly Lobel explores
a challenge that both corporate and government lawyers face in promoting
legal compliance. 16 She begins by describing the trend toward institutional
self-regulation and the development of cultures of regulatory compliance as
the preferred means of promoting legal compliance within institutions. She
underscores the importance of reporting misconduct internally, and at times
publicly, as an aspect of institutional self-regulation.1 7 She then critiques
judicial decisions that deny whistle-blower protection to in-house corporate
and government lawyers, thereby favoring the interest in corporate and
government lawyers' institutional loyalty. 18  She argues that recent
revisions to the American Bar Association's (ABA) Model Rules of
Professional Conduct and to the securities laws provide greater support to
in-house corporate lawyers "as gatekeepers of organizational ethical
behavior" by providing a framework for internal reporting and, only in
extreme cases, external reporting.' 9
II. PROMOTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS
Other contributors emphasize a different role for lawyers in a
democracy-namely, promoting public access to the law, the courts, and
other government institutions. Of course, this role is served to a degree in
any representation in which a lawyer advances a client's legal interests, and
especially so when the lawyer respects the client's autonomy by accepting
the client's direction or by letting the client's voice be heard. The focus by
these contributors, however, was on providing access particularly to the
poor, to racial or political minorities, and to other members of traditionally
disenfranchised populations.
Martin Bbhmer maintains that ensuring broad public access to the courts
is at once intrinsic to the lawyer's role in a constitutional democracy and
14. Id. at 1335.
15. Id.
16. Orly Lobel, Lawyering Loyalties: Speech Rights and Duties Within Twenty-First-
Century New Governance, 77 FORDHAM L. REv. 1245 (2009).
17. Id. at 1245-46.
18. Id. at 1256, 1261-63.
19. Id. at 1265-67.
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essential to justify lawyers' monopoly to practice in the courts.20 Drawing
on the writings of Carlos Nino, B6hmer conceives of the court as a forum
for public political deliberation. Courts serve three essential functions:
they play the crucial role of interpreting, developing, and applying the law
in a manner that respects the will of the majority; they implement a
constitution's countermajoritarian protections and processes; and they
ensure that the language of the law adapts to changing societal
developments in a manner that builds respectfully on a constitution's
foundations, framework, and essential architecture. Lawyers play a critical
role in facilitating these judicial functions, because courts cannot make
optimal decisions unless they receive all of the best arguments. Lawyers
serve as "rhetorical equalizers" by ensuring that all citizens' arguments are
represented and that the arguments are presented in their optimal form.21
Lawyers also serve as "translators" of their clients' private interests into
arguments calculated to persuade judges that favorable rulings will best
serve the public interest. Among the implications are that lawyers have a
pro bono obligation to ensure that all viewpoints and interests are
represented in judicial proceedings; that lawyers must meet high
educational standards to ensure their capability to find and make the best
arguments; and that the profession must promote judicial independence and
judicial integrity to ensure that courts function as intended.
Deborah Rhode focuses on pro bono work as an expression of American
lawyers' role in a democracy. 22 As she reminds us, the organized bar
proffers that, as "a public citizen having special responsibility for the
quality of justice," a lawyer has a professional obligation to provide unpaid
services for the public good, and especially, to do so by providing legal
services to low-income individuals who cannot otherwise secure them.23
But Rhode identifies pragmatic considerations that undermine American
lawyers' willingness and ability to fulfill this particular role.24 She argues
that current strategies for promoting pro bono work are misdirected:
lawyers would be willing to do this work for the intrinsic rewards that come
with acting ethically by doing good for those in need,25 but lawyers often
are encouraged to do this work for the extrinsic rewards, such as the
opportunity for training and experience or to enhance their firm's
reputation, with the result that the wrong cases are often accepted for the
wrong reasons. 26 Rhode outlines a strategic approach for law firms to adopt
20. Martin Bohmer, Equalizers and Translators: Lawyers' Ethics in a Constitutional
Democracy, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1363 (2009).
21. Id. at 1372-75.
22. Deborah L. Rhode, Rethinking the Public in Lawyers' Public Service: Pro Bono,
Strategic Philanthropy, and the Bottom Line, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1435 (2009).
23. Id. at 1435 (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. (2007)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
24. Id. at 1442-46.
25. Id. at 1436-37.
26. Id. at 1441.
2009] 1233
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
to promote the social impact and quality of pro bono work and the level of
participation. 27
Carla Pratt discusses the lawyer's role in promoting public access to the
courts and other institutions of governance, but with an emphasis on
lawyers' personal identity. 28 Contributing to the growing literature on race-
conscious models of lawyering, she explores black lawyers' special
capacity to promote black citizens' participation in particular. She
identifies and elaborates on three relevant roles for black lawyers: They
may serve a representative function by personally participating in
government institutions, thereby ensuring that black experiences and
commitments are represented and promoting public confidence in the
institution's representativeness. 29 They may serve an interpretive function
by communicating between the black community and democratic
institutions in terms that each understands and finds meaningful. 30 And
they may serve a connective function through pro bono work that gives
low-income black as well as nonblack citizens access to the courts. 31
Ascanio Piomelli shows how a "distinctive vision of democracy"
animates the work of one class of socially progressive lawyers whom he
calls "democratic lawyers." 32 He describes how these lawyers, construing
democracy to encompass citizens' participation "in public deliberation and
public action," 33 work with low-income and working-class individuals and
their representative organizations and coalitions "in struggles for dignity,
survival, self-determination, and other basic human needs."'34 Piomelli
argues that these lawyers' self-conception and inclusive, participatory
manner of work differs from that of traditional legal aid lawyers and others
who work with the same clientele. 35 Piomelli draws on John Dewey's
conception of democracy as a way of life and offers a vision of lawyers'
roles (at least for the lawyers who embrace this vision) as an alternative to
client-centered lawyering and its underlying emphasis on individuality. 36
III. PROMOTING SOCIAL CHANGE AND POLITICAL VALUES
For Piomelli, the democratic lawyer's participatory approach is
ultimately a means toward the goal of progressive social reform. Other
contributions similarly envision the pursuit of social reform, or the
advancement of particular moral, social, or political values, as a distinctive
27. Id. at 1446-52.
28. Carla D. Pratt, Way to Represent: The Role of Black Lawyers in Contemporary
American Democracy, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1409 (2009).
29. Id. at 1414-20.
30. Id. at 1420-23.
31. Id. at 1424-32.
32. Ascanio Piomelli, The Challenge of Democratic Lawyering, 77 FORDIHAM L. REV.
1383, 1407-08 (2009).
33. Id. at 1390-91.
34. Id. at 1394.
35. Id. at 1385-86.
36. Id. at 1392 n.28, 1399-401.
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function of lawyers in a democracy, whether deriving from lawyers' special
capacities and opportunities or from their intrinsic political or professional
obligations.
Jim Moliterno offers a vision of the lawyer's role in promoting a social
agenda that differs from Piomelli's participatory conception. 37 Molitemo
emphasizes lawyers' special capacity to serve as generals rather than foot
soldiers in social change movements, progressive or otherwise. He
describes how lawyers' legal training and ability especially equip them to
lead social movements outside the context of the traditional courtroom
advocacy role. 38  He offers the example of three lawyers-Mohandas
Gandhi, Ralph Nader, and Phyllis Schlafly-who drew on legal skills and
training, and on the lawyer's mind-set, to play this role. 39
Susan Carle goes further back in history to offer another account of how
legal training enhances the capacity to advance social justice.40 She tells
the compelling story of T. Thomas Fortune, a Howard Law School-trained
black journalist and public intellectual. Fortune's legal analyses in the
penultimate decade of the nineteenth century both contributed to the
intellectual groundwork for the modem civil rights movement and offered
alternative legal strategies for achieving racial justice. Together, the
contributions of Moliterno and Carle suggest a host of ways in which
practicing lawyers and others with legal training may use their skills to
advance social reform, including by devising strategies for judicial,
legislative, or other legal reform, by identifying potential allies and
alliances, and by developing persuasive rationales, evidence, and rhetoric to
justify reform.
Three Brazilian legal academics, Flavia Portella Piischel, Jos6 Rodrigo
Rodriguez, and Marta Rodriguez de Assis Machado, collaborate to offer a
comparative and jurisprudential perspective on the interrelationship of
lawyers, courts, and social change. 41 They examine efforts to advance the
civil rights of African-Brazilians through the adoption of antiracial criminal
laws that have since come to be regarded as judicially underenforced. The
coauthors conclude that the courts are not to blame for the laws'
ineffectiveness and that the problem lies in the criminal codification of
highly specific commands. 42 The authors argue that less determinate legal
norms would give judges more room to advance progressive social reform.
They urge Brazilian lawyers, as an alternative legal strategy, to encourage
37. James E. Molitemo, The Lawyer as Catalyst of Social Change, 77 FORDHAM L. REV.
1559 (2009).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1573-90.
40. Susan D. Carle, Debunking the Myth of Civil Rights Liberalism: Visions of Racial
Justice in the Thought of T. Thomas Fortune, 1880-1890, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1479 (2009).
41. Marta Rodriguez de Assis Machado, Flavia Portella Pischel & Jos6 Rodrigo
Rodriguez, The Juridification of Social Demands and the Application of Statutes: An
Analysis of the Legal Treatment of Antiracism Social Demands in Brazil, 77 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1535 (2009).
42. Id. at 1548-51.
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courts to adopt socially progressive interpretations of less determinate
laws 43-an approach typically identified more closely with common-law
than with civil-law traditions.
Does a lawyer's special capacity and opportunity imply a special
obligation to become an agent for social change? Fred Zacharias argues
that progressive lawyering is for some lawyers but not necessarily all. 44
Looking back on his own work as a public interest lawyer before entering
legal academia, he questions his earlier confidence in lawyers' role as
"catalysts for progressive reforms in the legal and social structures of the
nation."45  He suggests that lawyers' orientation toward their clients'
interests and objectives often leads lawyers to subvert rather than promote
progressive political and social values, and he expresses skepticism as to
whether lawyers' role in society obligates them to do otherwise. 46 Further,
as a substantive matter, he maintains that the meaning of democracy and the
content of democratic values are themselves up for grabs. 4 7 If lawyers are
to promote democratic values, he argues, they can be expected to do so only
as a matter of personal morality and choice, not as a matter of social or
professional obligation. 48
Not entirely so, says Robin Barnes.49  She joins in the view that
American lawyers have special abilities and opportunities to promote social
reform. But she suggests that lawyers also have an obligation to take
advantage of their special capacity, at least when it comes to supporting
democratic institutions and advancing distinctive democratic values as
opposed to social and political values that might fairly be contested in a
democracy. Thus, Barnes describes American lawyers as "our most
effective advocates for the maintenance and progress of democratic
institutions," and emphasizes their role in advancing two potentially
endangered values that she regards as especially essential to the
maintenance of democracy: judicial independence and academic
freedom. 50 Her contribution suggests that, even in a stable democracy,
democratic institutions can be threatened directly and indirectly, and that a
legal profession dedicated to maintaining these institutions, and to
supporting the conditions necessary to their effectiveness, may be best
positioned, and therefore socially or professionally obligated, to respond.
43. Id. at 1553-55.
44. Zacharias, supra note 2, at 1602-03.
45. Id. at 1592.
46. Id. at 1591-92.
47. Id. at 1597.
48. Id. at 1609.
49. Robin D. Barnes, Natural Legal Guardians ofJudicial Independence and Academic
Freedom, 77 FORDHAM L. REv. 1453 (2009).
50. Id. at 1459.
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IV. TENSIONS BETWEEN VARIOUS CONCEPTIONS OF THE LAWYER'S ROLE
At times, tensions may arise within and among different conceptions of
the lawyer's role in a democracy. For example, the job of bolstering
democratic institutions may sometimes conflict with the job of giving
clients a voice in democratic institutions, especially when the client's aim is
to tear those institutions down. Or the lawyer's work toward social or
political reform may appear to undermine the lawyer's role of promoting
the rule of existing law. Several contributions examine some of the
possible complexities.
Samuel Levine and Russell Pearce collaborate on a work that suggests
that, at least in some democracies, efforts to promote the rule of law by
upgrading the quality of practicing lawyers may be antithetical to the ideal
of the lawyer as a progressive social reformer. 5 1  On one hand, the
coauthors acknowledge, "[a] society that tempers commitment to majority
rule with protection of rule of law, as well as individual and group rights,
requires a vocation or vocations of lawyers to provide . . . expertise" in
representing clients in the judicial process. 52  The need for expertise
explains the American bar's advocacy, in developing democracies as well
as domestically, for demanding educational requirements to practice law. 53
But, the authors argue, the highly educated elite may identify excessively
with the ruling class that controls institutions in need of reform. The
interests of political and social reform may better be served by legal
professionals (such as China's "barefoot lawyers" or South Africa's
"paralegal advice officers") who have less education but greater
independence and identification with politically disenfranchised classes. 54
A cultural theorist, Rakesh Anand examines the tension between
American lawyers' role in promoting the rule of law and their role in
promoting law reform and political and social change in line with their
personal preferences. 55 Anand describes law's role in American public life
as quasi-religious and envisions the American lawyer's role as the
sustainment of public faith in the rule of law. 56 He argues that embracing
the concept that ours is a government of laws, not men, means that lawyers,
like judges, must conduct their work consistently with the impersonal
nature of the law. 57 On this conception, he argues provocatively that
American lawyers should ascribe no significance to their own moral, social,
and political "values, commitments, and desires" and therefore should not
promote their personal visions of social justice. This leads him to conclude
that it is inappropriate for American lawyers to practice as "cause lawyers,"
to choose or reject clients on political or ideological grounds, or to engage
51. Levine & Pearce, supra note 8, at 1661-63.
52. Id. at 1637.
53. See B6hmer, supra note 20, at 1380.
54. Levine & Pearce, supra note 8, at 1660-62.
55. Anand, supra note 2, passim.
56. Id. at 1616-17, 1623-24.
57. Id. at 1625 & n.59 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803)).
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personally in controversial political or ideological issues. 58 Rather, he
argues, their role is to lend their professional expertise to whoever retains
them.59
As a political theorist, on the other hand, Aziz Rana reaches a very
different but no less provocative conclusion about the significance of
lawyers' own political and social values to their professional work.60 At
least implicitly, his concern is with the tension between the lawyer's role in
giving clients a voice in democratic institutions (and thus giving primacy to
clients' personal autonomy) and the lawyer's interest in promoting his own
reform agenda. Rana sees lawyers' professional independence as essential
to a political tradition-associated with Abraham Lincoln and John Dewey,
among others-that views democracy as "a collective exercise in
continuous and extensive self-rule in all social institutions" and that
conceives of "work as both a permanent education in citizenship and a
central site for the everyday practice of moral reflection." 6 1 He offers his
conception as an alternative to, and rejection of, both sides in an ongoing
scholarly debate between those who ascribe to lawyers the "client-centered"
role of promoting clients' autonomy (to the exclusion of lawyers' own
values) and those who believe lawyers' advocacy on behalf of clients
should be tempered by a commitment to justice and the social good. 62
From the democratic function that Rana ascribes to lawyers, he derives a
professional obligation both to make legal processes more accessible to the
public and to "integrate a democratic ethos within particular
representational contexts." 63
Focusing on lawyers' advocacy role, Rebecca Roiphe provides a legal
historian's perspective on the tension between the client-centered (or
libertarian) and moral activist approaches. 64 She recognizes that beneath
the surface of these competing advocacy norms are different conceptions of
the lawyer's role in a democracy-on one hand, the idea that the role is to
give clients a voice in the administration of justice, and on the other hand,
the idea that the role is to promote and improve the administration of
justice. But she is not so sanguine that these are reconcilable. She tells the
story of Thomas Mooney, a labor leader and radical falsely convicted of
setting off a bomb at a prowar rally in 1916, and of the decades-long efforts
of a succession of lawyers to secure Mooney's release. As she describes,
Mooney viewed "the courtroom [as] a battleground to confront the enemy,
not a source of reasoned justice"-the enemy being American democracy. 65
58. Id. at 1629, 1630 n.80.
59. Id.
60. Aziz Rana, Statesman or Scribe? Legal Independence and the Problem of
Democratic Citizenship, 77 FORDHAM L. REv. 1665 (2009).
61. Id. at 1670.
62. Id. at 1673.
63. Id. at 1672.
64. Rebecca Roiphe, Lawyering at the Extremes: The Representation of Tom Mooney,
1916-1939, 77 FORDHAM L. REv. 1731 (2009).
65. Id. at 1748.
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Mooney's lawyers therefore had to grapple, in most of their experiences
unhappily, with the tension between Mooney's desire to use the
proceedings to express and promote the political objective of undermining
democratic governance-an objective to which his lawyers were generally
unsympathetic-and the aim of correcting the judicial process by securing
justice for an individual who was wrongly convicted. Roiphe notes the
obvious contemporary analogue in the experience of lawyers defending
Guantdnamo detainees.
Neta Ziv emphasizes a different side of the relationship between
lawyering and democracy. 66  As much as lawyers may shape the
development of democratic institutions, Ziv points out, democratic
institutions may shape lawyers' practice. In particular, government
agencies may influence how lawyers resolve the tension between promoting
clients' private interests and serving competing public values. Ziv draws on
Israel's experience since the mid-1980s, describing how the courts and
other government institutions were previously respectful and highly
protective of the bar's autonomy, but how since then the judiciary has
pushed the bar toward a more public serving orientation, even at clients'
expense. For example, she describes recent judicial doctrine expanding
lawyers' liability to unrepresented third parties in ways that promote the
public good at the expense of private clients' legal interests. The opinions
make lawyers civilly liable in certain situations when they advance
positions in transactional representations that, although arguably
overreaching, are perfectly legal from the client's perspective, and thus
consistent with both the rule of law and the client's interest in access to the
law. Ziv also details the recent amendments to the Israel Bar Association
Act by the Knesset, the Israeli legislature, that curtailed the bar's autonomy
in disciplining and regulating lawyers. 67
V. DEVELOPING, ARTICULATING, AND ADVOCATING THE VISION OF A
LAWYER'S ROLE IN A DEMOCRACY
In a contemporary democracy the relationship between lawyers and the
law is reciprocal. Lawyers have the capacity (used, ideally, for the better)
to influence the development of law, of democratic institutions, and of the
social conditions necessary to those institutions' effectiveness. At the same
time, lawyers are influenced by the law and legal institutions within which
they function.68 How lawyers conceptualize their own role within their
66. Neta Ziv, Regulation of Israeli Lawyers: From Professional Autonomy to Multi-
Institutional Regulation, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1763 (2009).
67. Id. at 1782-88.
68. See, e.g., Levine & Pearce, supra note 8 (discussing how high admission standards
for lawyers, together with the exclusion of nonlawyers from practicing law, may affect the
extent to which the bar represents and advances the interests of the politically
disenfranchised); Oko, supra note 5 (discussing the challenges of lawyering in Nigeria's




particular legal and political system and democratic tradition is therefore
important to how they conduct themselves individually and collectively.
The public conception of lawyers' role, which may differ from lawyers'
self-conception, in turn, affects how courts or other institutions regulate
lawyers. Thus, conceptions of the lawyer's democratic function are
important. Lawyers have a collective interest in developing and articulating
a vision of their role in a democracy and in advocating for that vision in
order to influence government institutions (courts, legislatures, and
executive officials alike) to respect lawyers' democratic function and leave
space for lawyers to effectively fulfill it.
Here are three quick stories (out of many possible ones) to make the
point. One story is old, the other two are very recent, and all three involve
U.S. lawyers.
The first story is the subject of In re Austin,69 a seminal 1835 decision on
the courts' authority to regulate the bar. The case involved the disbarment
of almost the entire Fayette County, Pennsylvania bar for sending and
publishing correspondence that was critical of and, in the view of the Court
of Common Pleas, disrespectful of the President of that court. Underlying
the question of whether the court had lawful authority to impose this
sanction was a question about the lawyer's role: as an "officer of the
court," did a lawyer have a duty to refrain from public criticism that the
lawyer may have intended to improve judicial decision making, but that
seemed disrespectful to the court? The lower court perceived that lawyers'
"office" implied an obligation of "good fidelity to the court,"'70 and that this
obligation called for the "observance of that trust, courtesy, and respect,
which is indispensable to the safe and orderly administration of justice." 71
The court considered the bar's public criticism of the judge to be
inconsistent with this role.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, however, emphasized the bar's role in
protecting the public from government overreaching. It viewed lawyers'
professional independence as intrinsic to this role, no doubt recognizing that
the judiciary was sometimes among the government entities from which the
public needed protection. "[T]o subject the members of the profession to
removal at the pleasure of the court," Chief Justice John Bannister Gibson
explained,
would leave them too small a share of the independence necessary to the
duties they are called to perform to their clients and to the public. As a
class, they are supposed to be, and in fact have always been, the
vindicators of individual rights, and the fearless asserters of the principles
of civil liberty; existing where alone they can exist, in a government not
of parties or men, but of laws! 72
69. 5 Rawle 191 (Pa. 1835).
70. Id. at 200.
71. Id. at 199.
72. Id. at 203.
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The legal profession's prescribed role did not mean that lawyers were
entirely free from regulation, including judicial regulation. But it did imply
limits on the courts' regulatory authority. Lawyers acting outside the
context of a legal representation or a judicial proceeding were entitled to
engage in the same lawful conduct, such as the publication of nonlibelous
criticisms of the court, that other private citizens could undertake.
The second story, the subject of People v. Jones,73 involved a newly
minted criminal defense lawyer, Brian Jones, who was assigned to represent
an indigent defendant the day before his scheduled trial date. Jones first
met his new client and appeared in court the next morning. Rejecting
Jones's application for a continuance to enable him to investigate the case
and provide a competent defense, the trial judge threatened Jones with a
criminal contempt prosecution if he did not start the trial several hours later.
Jones refused, viewing his obligation to provide a meaningful defense as
superior to his obligation to obey the court. Following a hearing, the trial
judge held Jones in contempt. As in Austin, the lower court's sanction
assumed a role for lawyers subservient to government institutions, and to
the judiciary in particular. But also as in Austin, the appellate court, which
overturned the sanction, gave primacy to lawyers' role in vindicating
clients' rights. Indeed, the appellate court declared that it would have been
contrary to the lawyer's professional obligation to "put his client's
constitutional rights at risk by proceeding to trial unprepared,"
notwithstanding the trial court's order that he do SO. 74
The last story, told in Vinluan v. Doyle,75 concerns an immigration
lawyer, Felix Vinluan, who was consulted by Filipino nurses working in
New York nursing homes with chronically ill children. Their employment
contract required them to make a three-year commitment, but the lawyer
advised them that their employers had breached the terms of the contract
and that they could quit their jobs before or after their shifts. When the
nurses did so, the District Attorney charged them with endangering minors;
further, he indicted Vinluan for conspiring with, and causing, the nurses to
endanger minors. The prosecutor's charging decision evidently reflected a
particular understanding of the lawyer's role in promoting the rule of law
and giving clients access to its benefits. Presumably, as far as counseling
clients about the criminal law was concerned, the prosecutor expected
lawyers to urge clients to comply with the most constraining possible
constructions. 76 The prosecutor invoked the blunt instrument of criminal
73. No. 2008-P-0018, 2008 WL 5428009 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 31, 2008).
74. Id. at *4. For an argument that courts should promote, rather than undermine,
criminal defense lawyers' professional competence, see Bruce A. Green, Criminal Neglect:
Indigent Defense from a Legal Ethics Perspective, 52 EMORY L.J. 1169 (2003).
75. No. 2008-02568, 2009 WL 93065 (N.Y. App. Div. Jan. 13, 2009).
76. Cf Wendel, supra note 13 (arguing that government lawyers advising on the law
were not obligated to predict judicial interpretations but did have to employ conventional
interpretative principles); see also Bruce A. Green, Taking Cues: Inferring Legality from
Others' Conduct, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1429 (2006).
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law to advance his conception. 77 A successful prosecution would have
implied that as a matter of professional role (and, if not, as a matter of self-
preservation), lawyers would have to call on clients to stay comfortably
within the ambiguous law's boundaries; otherwise, lawyers would risk
going to prison.
The appellate court had a more solicitous view, however. It found that
the nurses' conduct was constitutionally protected, and that the lawyer
therefore gave legally correct advice, not encouragement to commit crimes
as the prosecutor maintained. More importantly, however, the appellate
court emphasized that the lawyer's conduct would have been lawful even if
his advice turned out to be wrong. It flatly rejected the prosecutor's
argument "that an attorney who advises a client to take an action that he or
she, in good faith, believes to be legal, loses the protection of the First
Amendment if his or her advice is later determined to be incorrect. '78 The
court reasoned that
it would eviscerate the right to give and receive legal counsel with respect
to potential criminal liability if an attorney could be charged with
conspiracy and solicitation whenever a District Attorney disagreed with
that advice .... A looming threat of criminal sanctions would deter
attorneys from acquainting individuals with matters as vital as the breadth
of their legal rights and the limits of those rights. Correspondingly, where
counsel is restrained, so is the fundamental right of the citizenry, bound as
it is by laws complex and unfamiliar, to receive the advice necessary for
measured conduct. 79
The court thus took a different view of the lawyer's role in promoting the
rule of law and providing public access to the law-one calling on lawyers
to give independent advice about the law's meaning and, therefore,
necessitating leeway for the lawyer to offer advice with which government
institutions might disagree.
All three of these stories are about lawyers implementing visions of their
role that were later contested by government institutions. In Austin, the
local bar perceived that influencing or reforming government institutions-
in that case, the judiciary-was a legitimate democratic function for
lawyers. Brian Jones, as a criminal defense lawyer, sought to offer an
indigent criminal defendant meaningful access to the protection of the law
and legal processes. Felix Vinluan sought to do essentially the same for the
immigrant nurses whom he represented by giving them independent advice
about their contract rights. Powerful government institutions-two lower
courts, and a public prosecutor-sought in turn to promote competing
visions of lawyers' role. The stories all ended happily, in that appellate
courts resolved the conflicts in a manner that left room for lawyers' more
77. For a discussion of the tension between certain criminal prosecutions of lawyers and
the bar's conception of the lawyer's role, see Bruce A. Green, The Criminal Regulation of
Lawyers, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 327 (1998).




capacious visions. But one can easily imagine any of the lawyers folding
their tents before achieving vindication or the reviewing court adopting a
less protective legal understanding. 80  So, besides illustrating that
conceptions of the lawyer's role may be contested, and that the resolution of
the contest matters, these stories are cautionary tales. They underscore the
need for the legal profession, in the United States and abroad, to articulate
and defend its conception of a lawyer's democratic function.8 1  This
collection on "The Lawyer's Role in a Contemporary Democracy" should
encourage and advance the necessary conversation.
Let me conclude with some words of appreciation. First, my thanks to all
of the academics and practitioners who participated in the Fordham
Symposium and especially to those who contributed to this collection.
Each makes a singular contribution, and collectively they demonstrate the
vibrancy of the idea that lawyers have a special role in the well-being of a
contemporary democracy, even a stable and long-established one. Second,
my thanks to the members of the Fordham Law Review staff and editorial
board for their exceptional efforts in supporting the Symposium and
producing this collection.
Finally, I am especially grateful to the Law Review for dedicating this
collection to my friend Mary C. Daly,82 who served as Dean of the St.
John's University School of Law for the four years prior to her untimely
death in November 2008, and who before that was my Fordham colleague
for many years and my partner in directing the Stein Center for Law and
Ethics. For more than two decades, through her teaching, scholarship, and
myriad professional and academic activities, Mary Daly worked tirelessly
to advance lawyers' understandings regarding the legal profession's public
role and responsibilities locally, nationally, and internationally. Before that,
she served as a government lawyer in the U.S. Attorney's Office, where she
headed the Civil Division. The editors could not have selected a more
fitting book to dedicate to Dean Daly or a more deserving recipient of this
honor.
80. See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Rubin, 549 So. 2d 1000 (Fla. 1989) (sanctioning lawyer for
refusing to comply with trial court's order to proceed with a criminal case and present the
defendant's false testimony); In re Westfall, 808 S.W.2d 829 (Mo. 1991) (en banc)
(sanctioning prosecutor for publicly criticizing trial judge's opinion); People v. Stewart, 656
N.Y.S.2d 210 (App. Div. 1997) (upholding criminal contempt prosecution of lawyer who,
prior to appellate review, refused to comply with a trial court order requiring her to testify
about information learned while representing a criminal defendant).
81. For reflections on the organized bar's role in promoting law reform, and the
deliberative processes by which it reaches its positions, see Elizabeth Chambliss & Bruce A.
Green, Some Realism About Bar Associations, 57 DEPAuL L. REv. 425 (2008).
82. See William Michael Treanor, Dean Mary Daly: A Tribute, 77 FORDHAM L. REv.
1221 (2009).
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